

Series II
Subjects Files,
1916-1973

Box 14, Folder 5

Correspondence,
Letters sent,
1952

0 1 3 2

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

January 4, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

I have now returned from leave and, during the past several days, have been working on Admiral Toyoda's decisions with relation to the employment of carrier aircraft from land bases. I am therefore sending you these pages - some to replace those already in the book and others new. If you have any thoughts on them I should appreciate what you have to say.

With hopes that you and Mrs. Tanaka, as well as others in Admiral Heffernan's office have enjoyed a Merry Christmas and with best wishes for a Happy New Year, I am,

Sincerely,



R. W. BATES

Encl: Pages No. 27 to 33 inclusive - Orange Side Battle
For Leyte Gulf.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Naval Records and History Section,
Room 2515,
Washington 25, D.C.

0133

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

9 January 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

Your letter of 4 January, describing the methods used in extracting the DesOpOrds of 6FGB and other units has been received and I am sure the material will prove very valuable in my analysis.

I note your remarks and suggestions in regard to translating the land based Naval Air material. I am willing in these cases to make the exceptions you desire but I wish to stress again two points:

(a) While it is true that we cannot, due to the time element, translate every page of every minor action report, I do not want to miss any item which may be of assistance to me in analyzing the Command Decisions. I agree that it is not worth while to become bogged down in the detailed actions of individual planes or unimportant air units, but I do not want to miss out on items which might be of assistance to me in my major concern - i.e. Command.

(b) While it is true that we will need translations covering the period 15-25 October in order to analyze the naval battles, my major concern now is the filling in of the picture up to 0719 October 17th. Therefore, I would like you to generally favor the period prior to October 17th at this time, particularly those items which will help to portray adequately the Japanese situations as of 0600, October 10th and each morning thereafter including any strength figures of air units and any estimates upon which the Japanese Command based their decisions.

Naturally, if the documents will not be available later, or if the time required to translate items covering the latter part of October is not unduly great, then it would be better to translate them at the same time as earlier items.

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I believe that the material you have uncovered will give me an adequate picture of 6FGB, and I hope you will be able to do as well for 5FGB and 4th Air Army. Also, I hope we can get some information later on the submarine activities. With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely,



R. W. BATES

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami
Room 2515
Office of Naval Records and History Section
Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

0135

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

January 17, 1951

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

Thank you very much for your prompt comments concerning Japanese Command Relations. It appears that with very limited change many of your comments can be readily incorporated into the Chapter. You have written with great fullness and it shows great knowledge - certainly far above mine - concerning Japanese Command Procedures.

We agree here, in general, with nearly everything you have said with the possible exception of the comment concerning the Army and Navy General Staff. We have orders here in our collection which were issued by the Naval General Staff without any indication that they had flowed from Imperial General Headquarters. Naturally, I want to get this correct. We feel that if you could see one of the orders you would modify your comment on this point.

I like your critical ability and your comments are very much "on the ball." I am learning steadily, I hope.

With best wishes to you and Mrs. Tanaka and anyone else who might be interested, I am,

Sincerely yours,



R.W. BATES

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 2517,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0136

February 13, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

I enjoyed my discussions with you down there with relation to matters under consideration here at the War College, and I appreciate the research you have been doing in endeavoring to bring up the background. I also enjoyed my lunch with you and Roger. You fellows live in style - here we are cafeteria fed.

I am very anxious to obtain the dispatches and other papers which you and Mrs. Tanaka have been collecting during the past week. However, except for that data, in general I want no more background data which is not already translated. The reason is that I have been directed to get out my first volume this summer and we must move on. Of course, in this connection, background items may appear from time to time which you may feel important enough to send up here. In such case, please send them.

As Commander Hartmann will be detached in June, and as he has been working with Captain Rochefort on the Japanese side, it is essential that all data effecting the operations up to 0719, October 17th, 1944, be received as soon as possible, in order that I may complete the smooth manuscript prior to Hartmann's departure.

The data I need now to complete the work up to October 17th embraces, in a large part, the following attacks by the Third Fleet, China Based Aircraft, and Japanese Army and Navy Air Units. The translations which you have already sent us furnish considerable information, but it is possible that you may have discovered more information during your research. If such is not the case, then please let me know so that I may proceed with what I have.

(1) Damage sustained by Japanese, including planes, ships and ground installations, by bombing attacks of:

- (a) Third Fleet against Ryukyus on 10 Oct.
- (b) Third Fleet against Appari on 11 Oct.
- (c) Third Fleet against Heito, Matsuyama and Kagi Airfields, Takao shipping, and Karenko ground installations (and others in the same area) and Northern Formosa, on 12 Oct.

- (d) Third Fleet against Heito, Okayama, Einansho, Taito, Kagi, Toko Seaplane Base, and other airfields in the strike area, as well as Pescadores, Miyako Jima, and Ishigaki Jima, on 13 Oct.
- (e) Third Fleet against Okayama, Heito, Reigaryo, Shinchiku, Kanken, Taifu, Matsuyama and other lesser airfields and installations, on 14 Oct.
- (f) Third Fleet against Appari and Loag, on 14 Oct.
- (g) Third Fleet against Manila area, fields, on 16 Oct.
- (h) China Based Aircraft against Okayama, Taichu Airfield and Makushu Island, in the Pescadores on 14 Oct.
- (i) China Based Aircraft against Okayama, Heito, and Takao as well as other targets on 16 Oct.

(2) Results claimed and damage sustained by Japanese during air attacks on Third Fleet on 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 Oct.

The reason for desiring the above specific data now is that the book must be reviewed by a board here and I want to get it reviewed not later than April. As a matter of fact, Admiral Hewitt is going to review, in March, what we have written to date.

With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely,

R.W. BATES

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 2517,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

February 14, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

Thank you very much for your additional information which was received today. It is all very helpful and will assist me greatly in producing the correct narrative from which I hope to draw sound conclusions on command.

I was particularly pleased to receive it since Commander Hartmann will be detached in June and I desire to finish Volume I before he leaves. This volume will cover operations up to 0719, October 17th. Commander Hartmann has been working with Captain Rochefort on the Japanese air operations while I have been working with Captain Rochefort on the other Japanese data. I hope that as you complete your translations you will forward them promptly so that I may complete the smooth manuscript.

It seems to me that the data that I now need to complete the work up to 0719, October 17th, embraces in a large part the results of the air attacks by the Third Fleet and by the China Based Aircraft against OKINAWA, FORMOSA and the PHILIPPINES and, in return, the results reported by Japanese planes against the Third Fleet. Of course, I realize that you have already sent us considerable information on these matters, but it is possible that you may have discovered more information during your more recent research which you have not had time, as yet, to translate or which, if already translated, you have not forwarded.

The additional data which I am seeking covers:

(a) The damage sustained by the Japanese in planes (both Army and Navy), shipping, and ground and harbor installations, because of Allied air strikes. These strikes are here listed to facilitate your consideration of them.

- (1) Third Fleet against Ryukyus on 10 Oct.
- (2) Third Fleet against Aparri on 11 Oct.
- (3) Third Fleet against Heito, Matsuyama and Kagi Airfields, Takao shipping, and Karenko ground installations (and others in the same area) and Northern Formosa, on 12 Oct.

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- (4) Third Fleet against Heito, Okayama, Einansho, Taito, Kagi, Toko Seaplane Base, and other airfields in the strike area, as well as Pescadores, Miyako Jima, and Ishigaki Jima, on 13 Oct.
- (5) Third Fleet against Okayama, Heito, Reigaryo, Sinchiku, Karenko, Taien, Matsuyama and other lesser airfields and installations, on 14 Oct.
- (6) Third Fleet against Aparri and Loaog, on 14 Oct.
- (7) Third Fleet against Manila area, fields, on 16 Oct.
- (8) China Based Aircraft against Okayama, Taichu Airfield and Nakushu Island, in the Pescadores on 14 Oct.
- (9) China Based Aircraft against Okayama, Heito, and Takao as well as other targets on 16 Oct.

(b) The results claimed and the damaged sustained by the Japanese during their air attacks on the Third Fleet on 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, October 1944.

Perhaps you have discovered some new data in the last material from Tokyo which Captain Rochefort brought to you. If you have not already done so, this new material, which I understand is in very limited volume, should be translated as Captain Rochefort thinks that it is very valuable for our purposes here, and should answer some of the questions concerning the 6th Base Air Force.

The reason for desiring the above specific data now is that the book should be reviewed by a board here and I want to get it in the hands of the reviewers not later than the end of April. As a matter of fact, Admiral H.K. Hewitt is going to review, in March, what we have written to date.

If, after reasonable effort, you cannot find additional data on the several items of (a) and (b) above, please advise me so that we can go ahead knowing that we have all that there is.

Finally, I want you to know how much I enjoyed my discussions with you down there with relation to matters under consideration here at the War College, and how much I appreciate the research you have been doing in endeavoring to bring up the background. I also enjoyed my lunch with you and Roger. You fellows live in style - here we are cafeteria fed.

With kindest regards to yourself, to Mrs. Tanaka and to Roger Pineau, I am,

Very sincerely yours


R.W. BATES

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Room 2517,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Navy Department
Washington 25, D.C.

0140

Answers for Commodore

1. Des Op Ords issued by Combined Fleet hqs. (C/S)
Special Des Op Ords by Toyoda on Formosa.
2. It is highly probable that C/S Combined Fleet, in the absence of Toyoda, had authority to issue certain orders required by existing plans, such as No. 331 - SHO 2 alert for base air forces - 0925 10 Oct. This dispatch was addressed info to SHINCHIKU Base, where TOYODA was, and TOYODA ^{later} issued Special Des Op Ord No. 5 extending the alert to SHO 1.
3. However, I am sure that it would be incorrect to assume that all the Combined Fleet Des Op Ords issued from TOKYO were issued by C/S Combined Fleet without reference to TOYODA. I don't think C/S had such authority, and I am almost certain that all the Combined Fleet Des Op Ords issued subsequent to the alert order while Toyoda was on Formosa were issued by C/S Combined on instruction from TOYODA. Probably these instructions were given by telephone, but I am not sure.

It is, I think, entirely out of the question that Combined Fleet Des Op Ord 334 (ie Cardis 334) could have been issued by C/S Combined on his own authority. That would

mean C/S Combined Fleet could decide virtually everything on his own authority without consulting TOYODA. If such were the case, then C/S Combined could order one thing from Tokyo, and TOYODA could order something quite contrary from Formosa. In this specific case, C/S Combined could be ordering carrier air units to prepare for land-based operations while TOYODA planned to use them aboard the carriers and order a sortie. Obviously, control of operations had to be in one man, and it was in TOYODA.

4. Whether or not Toyoda issued a special despatch from Formosa or directed Combined Fleet by at HIYOSHI to issue a regular Combined Fleet Despatch - probably was simply a matter of convenience or urgency. It is most likely that he issued special despatches when it was inconvenient or would involve delay to go through Combined Fleet by. At other times, he simply instructed ^{C/S} Combined Fleet to issue the order in his (Toyoda's) name.

After the Suluan Landing, Toyoda issued the first ^{Combined Fleet} alert order from Formosa. All subsequent ^{Combined Fleet} orders he issued thru Combined Fleet by, although he did not return to Tokyo until the 18th.

5. Believe I made some reference to this specific matter

in the manuscript which I loaned you. Please check and see.

6. If you want to know exactly how Toyoda and C/S combined communicated with each other, I can write to Capt Ohnaka in Tokyo and find out. But it will take time.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

February 15, 1952.

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

I am having difficulty in discerning the command relation which existed between Toyoda on Formosa and his Chief of Staff at Hiyoshi. Some of the dispatches have been translated to say that the CinC, Combined Fleet issued some order and then it refers to DesOpOrd 331. But, the DesOpOrd numbers were kept at Hiyoshi. Again there are special DesOpOrders from Formosa which are indicated as from CinC, Combined Fleet. What I am interested in discovering is this. How did Toyoda and his Chief of Staff maintain contact? Was it by telephone? By cable? By radio? By special messenger? Or not at all? Captain Rochefort believes, and he might well be right, that the DesOpOrds were all issued from Tokyo, and all by the Chief of Staff, whether it says so or not, without necessarily referring them to Toyoda, and that the special DesOpOrds which were issued from Formosa were by Toyoda himself.

The reason why I am concerned is that I have discovered that in my writeup I gave Toyoda the credit for issuing, at 1019, the order directing the carrier planes to prepare for land-based duty whereas the order may have come from the Chief of Staff. It would appear as if such an order should properly have come from Toyoda.


Have you any thoughts in this matter?

I wish that you would drop everything to give me a clarification of the above if you can. Meanwhile, I will call you at 10 o'clock on Tuesday, February 19th in Roger Pineau's office.

Mind you, I don't care how this system worked, I merely want to know the mechanics of it.

With best regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,



R.W. BATES.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 2517, Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0144

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

February 26, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

This is just a note to thank you very much for the highly productive manner in which you are providing this command with data which is necessary for the proper completion of our work.

In your searches, if you happen to find the physical location of CinC, Mobile Force, I should like to obtain it. That is, was he, on October 10th, in his flagship and if so, what ship was it at that time and where was it, or was he ashore? That is, did he have shore headquarters, if so, where? In such case, when did he embark in his flagship on or after October 10th?

Also, we have no definite information concerning the searches out of KANOYA for October 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th. We do know that some were run by the 12th Recco Unit on several of these days, but their report does not indicate the sector searched. Possibly some other units in that area also carried out searches. Do you have, at hand, any further information on this? Please don't give this too much of your time as KANOYA searches, while informative, are not important.

Best regards to you and Mrs. Tanaka, I am,

Very sincerely yours,



R.W. BATES.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, Main Navy,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0145

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

February 28, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

A couple of questions have arisen. In connection therewith, I would appreciate it if you would send me up the War Diary of Mobile Force for October 1944, if available.

What I am looking for are some main points such as the physical location of 653 and 634 Air Groups and carriers on about October 10th and I can't see asking you to search for this as it would keep you from more important searches.

I am sending you back also the War Diaries of Crudiv 5, etc., under separate cover.

With very best regards to you, Roger and Mrs. Tanaka, I am,

Very sincerely yours,


J.J. ROCHEFORT,
Captain, U.S. Navy.

Encl (SC) - WD Crudiv 5, etc.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, Main Navy,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0146

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Señor Kawakami

DATE: March 4, 1952

FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates, USN

SUBJECT: Japanese data; request for

1. As a matter of interest, and without throwing you off your stride in the air data for Hartmann, can you tell me:

(a) What destroyers did Commander Striking Force send to:

(1) Assist in transferring 653rd Air Group from Cardiv ³4 to southern Kyushu? (One of these was to be the HATSUHARU).

(2) Assist in transferring 634th Air Group?

(b) Were the orders issued by Comdr Striking Force by dispatch or by telephone, etc?

(c) Did the destroyers go?

0147

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

-2-

2. This data should be readily located in Desron 11 or Desdiv 61.
It is not in Desron One.


R.W. BATES

0148

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami

DATE: 29 February 1952.

FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates, USN (Ret).

SUBJECT: Japanese translations, typed copies; disposition of

1. I have noted with considerable surprise that an original and five (5) copies of your translations are required. I have been trying to discover where they went and I find out, more by rumor than fact, that you get two (2) copies and Roger Pineau gets two (2) for Admiral Morison.

2. It was my understanding that there would be two (2) copies for the War College (one for my office and one for the War College Archives) one for your file in Washington and one for Admiral Morison. Where do the others go?

3. Can you clear this up for me? Extra copies take time and labor and affect operation costs which all of us are concerned with these days.

R.W. Bates.

R.W. BATES.

0149

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami

DATE: 6 March 1952

FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates, USN

SUBJECT: Trip to Washington

1. I am coming to Washington early next week to attend to some matters in the Pentagon. I will try and drop in to see you.

2. With best regards, I am,



R.W. BATES.

0150

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami

DATE: 29 February 1952

FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates, USN (Ret).

SUBJECT: Flow of information

1. We are delighted with the flow of information up here, but don't knock yourself out. I understand that whisky is not available for resuscitation purposes in Main Navy. If it is, Admiral Heffernan must have it for soothing purposes and has given me, as yet, none. Perhaps you have discovered it.

2. You and Mrs. Tanaka may go to the head of the class!



R.W. BATES.

0151

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

March 26, 1952.

Dear Kawakami:

With reference to the Commodore's question, another point has been bothering me, viz.

On 10 Oct CinC, GF directed that operational planes of Cardiv's 3 and 4 be readied for shore-based (KICHI) operations.

On 12 Oct CinC, GF ordered _____ planes of 3 Sf and 4 Sf to be placed under the operational control of 6 FGB.

In the translations we have, the message of the 12th has been rendered as "planes capable of land-based operations", which is confusing because, if the planes were capable of carrier operations they were certainly capable of land-based operations, which means that practically all, if not all, 3 Sf and 4 Sf would be transferred. Actually only 154 were transferred. On the assumption that GF meant something else, I have gone to the ZUIKAKU copy of the dispatch contained in ZUIKAKU War Diary and have come up with the following translation.

.... All planes which are flyable (or operable) from shore bases

The ZUIKAKU copy reads as follows:

.... NO KICHI SAKUSEN KANO (KO SE HA) ZEN RYOKU WO
SHITE *飛 せ 八*

If the part in the paren is read - (if navigable) allowing for the omission of the NIGORI it seems to make sense.

If you have another copy I would appreciate your comments on the above.

My thought is that CinC meant - "transfer all Cardiv 3 and 4 planes which can operate - that is which are flyable from - shore bases to 6 FGB." The idea being - transfer all planes which can get off the ground at a shore base and reach the target.

Best regards,

J. J. Rochert
J. J. ROCHEFORT.

0152

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

March 26, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

A matter has arisen here which is of great interest to me.

CinC, Combined Fleet, on October 12th, directed Commander FIRST Mobile Force to place all air units of Cardiv 3 and 4 capable of operating from land bases to the tactical command of the Commander SIXTH Base Air Force (CinC, DesOpOrd No. 344) (ZUIKAKU War Diary - WDC Document 161636).

As a consequence of this dispatch Commander Mobile Force in consultation with the Staff of Commander SIXTH Base Air Force agreed that 26 Zero fighters, 23 fighter-bombers, 29 Tenzans, and 5 carrier attack planes of Cardiv 3 were to be based at KAGO SHIMA, and that 40 Zero fighters of Cardiv 4 would be based at KANOYA, 9 carrier bombers at KOKUBU, 10 Tenzans at KAGO SHIMA and 12 seaplane bombers at IBUSUKI. All of the above is also contained in the War Diary ZUIKAKU, and is a dispatch marked 121636.

What I am interested in discovering is (a) how many planes and what type were in the 634th Air Group (Cardiv 4) and in the 653rd Air Group (Cardiv 3). Ozawa, in his interrogation page 220 of NAV No. 55 Vol I indicates that roughly 150 planes were sent to Formosa leaving him 110 planes. This indicates a probable total of 260. Can you discover also:

- (1) The complement of planes and types for each carrier?
- (2) Why the number of planes available for land duty were but 83 in Cardiv 3, and 71 in Cardiv 4 or roughly a 60% availability?
- (3) Was this possibly because the planes were being processed for land service and only this % was available?
- (4) Did the remaining planes of Cardiv's 3 and 4 remain under Commander Mobile Force?

I am enclosing a prospective page on the operations of Commander Mobile Force.

With best regards to you and Mrs. Tanaka, I am,

Very sincerely yours,



R.W. BATES.

Encl.

Operations of Cdr Mobile Force (2 pages)

0153

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami

DATE: 3 April 1952

FROM : Captain J.J. Rochefort, USN

SUBJECT: Copy of Japanese translation; request for

1. You have been mailed (inadvertently) five (5) copies of -
SUBJECT: Supplementary Material, 6 FGB Operations Orders re; SHO
Operations.

2. One copy is required for the War College Archives.

3. Please return one copy to me.


J.J. ROCHEFORT.

You and your "ex aint Japanese"!!

0154

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami

DATE: 3 April 1952

FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates, USN

SUBJECT: Japanese translations

1. Thank you very much for your last two papers which you sent here. The one concerning Admiral Ozawa's comments on September 10th regarding SHO was exactly what I was seeking and it is definitely helpful. The papers received today concerning the composition of the Air Groups on the carriers are also very much to the point and your analysis seems very thorough.
2. Captain Rochefort says, "KO SEBA means, 'if navigable' in Japanese jargon."
3. My thanks to you and Mrs. Tanaka.



R.W. BATES.

0155

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami

DATE: 25 March 1952.

FROM : Commodore R.W. Bates, USN

SUBJECT: Translations; request for

Encl: (1) Copy of ltr from GHQ FEC Mil.Hist.Sect. APO 500.
(2) Imperial Navy in the Last Stage, Admiral Soemu Toyoda.

1. I will appreciate the translation of the part of the enclosed book which is marked as soon as practicable.

2. For your information I am enclosing a copy of a letter from Tokyo pertaining to the same subject.


R.W. BATES.

0156

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAIR EAST COMMAND
Military History Section, Special Unit

APO 500
14 March 1952

President, Naval War College
Naval War College,
Newport, R.I.

Dear Sir:

Reference your letter of 21 February 1952.

Most of the orders to the Combined Fleet during the period 10-20 October were issued from the Headquarters Combined Fleet at Hiyoshi in the name of the CinC of the Combined Fleet and were not the results of orders originating from Admiral Toyoda. The orders from Hiyoshi were designated as Des Op Ord No. _____. Admiral Toyoda also issued orders when he thought it necessary and these orders were designated Des Spec Op Ord No. _____, the distinguishing factor being the insertion of the word "Special."

Before Admiral Toyoda left Hiyoshi for an inspection trip to Luzon, he gave the following general instructions to his Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Kusaka: "After careful consultations with the Navy General Staff, the necessary decisions and orders should be issued from Hiyoshi headquarters in the name of the CinC, Combined Fleet." Admiral Toyoda stopped off at Shinchiku, Formosa after his trip to Luzon and during this period he did not take direct command. This was due to the fact that he had with him only two staff officers (Deputy Chief of Staff and an Air Operations Staff Officer) and further the poor communications facilities at Shinchiku precluded close liaison with the various fleet headquarters.

One instance where Admiral Toyoda did exercise his command was when U.S. carrier-borne aircraft raided Formosa. At 0930 on the day of the attack, Hiyoshi headquarters had alerted the Base Air Force and Admiral Toyoda also alerted the Base Air Force, unaware that Hiyoshi headquarters had already done so about three hours earlier. Upon learning this fact, Admiral Toyoda took it for granted that Hiyoshi headquarters would issue further orders to effect the so called Sho Operations. By the following day, however, no orders had been issued, therefore, Admiral Toyoda wired (telegram) Yihoshi suggesting that "the orders to begin the operations be issued from Hiyoshi after a thorough discussion with the Navy Section, Imperial General Headquarters."

In reference to your para. 3c, Admiral Toyoda did not consult Vice Admiral Fududome concerning the situation at that time. In fact Vice Admiral Fududome was at Kanoya, Kyushu at the time of the attack.

The above information was obtained from "Imperial Navy in the Last Stage", Admiral Soemu Toyoda, (Tokyo, 1950), pp. 152-3 and

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COPY

-2-

"Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, Vol IV", Military History Section, FEC, p. 20, Statement of Rear Admiral Takata, Toshitane, Copies of both sources are attached.

/s/ JAMES M. MILLER
JAMES M. MILLER
Lt Colonel, Inf
Executive

COPY

0158

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

April 15, 1952.

AIRMAIL

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

As I am not sure whether or not Roger Pineau has departed, I am sending this to you with the request that you deliver it to him or send it on to Tokyo as necessary.

As you know, we have queried CHQ at Tokyo for additional information; the more important items of which are:

- (a) Japanese air documents pertaining to Battle for Leyte Gulf. Particularly those of Fourth Air Army (Philippines).
- (b) Estimates of the Situation prepared by the more responsible commands during September and October.

In addition, Captain Rochefort wrote a personal letter to Captain Pearce, elaborating on the above to include:

- (a) CinC, Combined Fleet OpOrds 83 and 85 of August.
- (b) Submarine OpOrds, Battle Reports, War Diaries, etc.

To date we have received a microfilm of 6 FGB orders, and a typed list of some other orders, including a 6th Fleet report on submarines covering the period 1 Jan-31 March 1945. This material has proven very valuable except for the submarine report which does not deal with the Leyte Gulf action.

I should appreciate Pineau's contacting Captain Pearce and Colonel Hartman of the Historical Division GHQ, and after conveying my personal thanks for their fine cooperation, to ascertain if there is any additional information which could be made available to us, particularly on submarines and Fourth Air Army.


0159

-2-

While, I don't believe, based on past experience, that any personal interview of Toyoda, Kurita et al would be especially valuable in view of the faulty memories after seven years, I do believe that it would be worthwhile if those officers have documents, prepared at the time, which could be made available to us by GHQ. Prior to taking this step, Colonel Hartman should be consulted.

With our best wishes for a successful trip to Tokyo for Monsieur Pineau, and with best wishes to yourself and to Mrs. Tanaka, I am,

Sincerely yours,



R.W. BATES.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records & History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0160

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

April 21, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

Thank you for your continued interest in the translations and for ensuring that they are correct.

For your information, we are finishing October 14th. I will send you the draft of what I have written of the Japanese Operations presently, as I know that you are interested.

I wish you would ask Roger Pineau if he can obtain, in Japan, a photograph of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who was CinC, Combined Fleet at the time of the Battle of Savo Island; of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, who commanded the 8th Fleet in that action; of Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto, who commanded the Support Force, that is, CruDiv 6, there; of Rear Admiral Mitsuharu Matsuyama, who commanded CruDiv 18, there, and of Rear Admiral Sadayoshi Yamada, who commanded the Fifth Air Attack Force.

For your information, these photographs are desired for the film being made of that action.

I know, of course, that Morison, in his Volume V, has photographs of Yamamoto and Mikawa and we may be forced to use them if we cannot get others.

Best to you.

Sincerely yours,



R.W. BATES.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN Navy,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.

0161

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

MEMORANDUM to be discussed with Mr. Kawakami:

Both Commander Hartmann and I are not clear about your writeup concerning the situation estimate on September 17th. You may be correct that they actually expected a two-prong offensive simultaneously, in which case the First Striking Force would react against the North invasion force. Again, it could well be that the Japanese expected a two-prong invasion, but not simultaneous. In other words, they expected a landing in the Southern Philippines. Also, it appears that the First Striking Force would not be used under any circumstances against a Southern landing. If this latter is true, it makes sense, as Allied land based aircraft would be near by.

It seems most logical to say that the Japanese expected landings in the Southern Philippines which they would endeavor to beat off with land based air power and land defenses. It also seems logical to say that the Japanese expected that if their air power did not prove effective then the Allies would also land in the Central or Northern Philippines. In such case, the First Striking Force would be used against the Allied invasion forces in the North.

0162

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

May 26, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

Thank you very much for the dope on the Supply Force. I am trying to find a suitable reading glass, and if so, may be able to do something. I had the photostat blown up, but it just made bad matters worse.

I am not sure whether I mentioned the matter or not when I was down there, but would like to get some information, if available, regarding the fueling at Lingga by the three BatDiv's, CruDiv FOUR and DesRon TWO. I did not find any information in the War Diaries of BatDiv ONE or the other ships, contained I think, in WDC 161636, nor is there any mention made of it in the Action Report of BatDiv ONE, which I have with me now.

Commodore is rather keen on any additional information on the Philippine air side between 17th and 22nd October. I am extracting a fair amount subsequent to the 23rd from the Action Report of BatDiv ONE and I think that the situation after the 22nd or 23rd is not too bad now.

I assured the Commodore that, in my opinion and I believe in your opinion, there is not much information available in the Archives that could be extracted in a reasonable length of time, that is without extremely extensive translations involving years. I am still hopeful of getting some additional information of submarines from Tokyo, failing that I know of no other source.

I know that you and I have talked this matter over repeatedly, and all we can do is to leave no stone unturned to dig up additional sources. I know you will keep this in mind.

I enjoyed my trip very much particularly in talking both to you and Mrs. Tanaka. Trusting that the weather is not getting too uncomfortable for you, I am, with very best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,


J.J. ROCHEFORT,
Captain, U.S. Navy.

0163

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R. I.

June 5, 1952

Dear Mr. Kawakami:

Thank you very much for your fine letter of May 28th relative to your continued employment with the Navy. I understand your problem thoroughly and in general concur with your views and have so advised Mr. Cassidy. Perhaps by the time you have seen this letter, Mr. Cassidy will have reconsulted you.

I can not agree with the thought that there is not much more translation work to be done. Certainly if we consider only the top commander's reports your view would be correct. However, in my experience over the years in this work, I have discovered that by translating the individual ships a better picture can be obtained than by basing everything from the commander's reports. What I am after, in this analysis, is not only what the commander thought, but the feeling within the command. In many of the lesser ship reports there are statements and dispatches of great consequence and importance which are often not found in the top commander's reports at all. So, it is my plan to endeavor to translate more or less completely the lesser ship reports -- perhaps not all of them, but certainly most of them. For example, at the present time we are preparing to do Surigao Strait as a side dish to the background work which is still underway. In this connection, I note that you say, "There is nothing except the Ushio left for 2 YB." I had hoped that there might be something from the Nachi since so many of her papers were found in her hull after she sank.

To return to the original discussion -- for a necessity of a Civil Service rating. I have been advised by the responsible bureaus that the contractual idea is out in this case. Funds evidently are not available. Besides for reasons which I do not entirely know, the Navy Department prefers to have people Civil Service.

I hope, presently, to hear that one way or another that this situation has been amicably settled and that you are still with us.

0164

Perhaps by now you have received the preliminary draft of the Japanese side through October 15th. When I have completed the 16th, which I am working on now, I will send it also. I hope you will find time to read it and if you see any errors on technical matters I hope you will feel free to comment thereon. The strategy and tactics in it, as expressed to date, seems to be correct since they have been thoroughly appraised by Admiral H.K. Hewitt, a recognized Naval authority and former CinC in Europe. So, I am not concerned on that score, but I am concerned that here and there I may not have had all the facts which you, with your considerable knowledge of Japanese affairs, may have.

I don't want you to go into this draft in the great detail that you did on the earlier pages as the time is short, but I do want you to go into it with your customary thoroughness wherever you can. Since Commander Hartmann will be leaving around the 18th, if you can return the papers by that time it will be of great help to me.

Finally, I hope that Monsieur Pineau is forwarding to you the material which he is collecting for us without waiting to bring it home when he comes. I don't know when he plans to return, but I do know that I should like to get, very shortly, an idea as to the nature of this material and its applicability to the period before October 17th.

With best regards to you and Mrs. Tanaka, I am,

Very sincerely yours,



R.W. BATES.

Mr. Clarke H. Kawakami,
Office of Naval Records and History,
Room 1534, MAIN NAVY,
Washington 25, D.C.

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